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Officially announcing their presence with the Open Letter of 1985, Hizbullah have 
altered from what Ranstorp called a “rag-tag militia”1 to a political party with 
veto power in the Lebanese cabinet. However, Hizbullah’s current direct military 
presence in Syria and Iraq, confirm the geographic expanse of their actions 
transcends Lebanon as a political stage. But why, on the 30th anniversary of Taif, 
can Hizbullah still not be contained within the political and geographical 
boundaries of Lebanon? 
  
Exploring how the Taif agreements both tamed Hizbullah’s actions and rhetoric 
whilst simultaneously laying the conditions for transnational actions, this paper 
argues that the imperfect conditions set by the Taif accords has assisted in the rise 
of Hizbullah’s self-coined “Resistance Axis”. Post-Taif, Hizbullah have tended 
relations with the same external forces that helped broker the peace while 
unlocking the potentials contained in the exceptional decision to allow Hizbullah 





INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND TO HIZBULLAH’S EMERGENCE 
Hizbullah’s current direct military presence in Syria and Iraq, confirm the geographic expanse 
of their actions transcends Lebanon as a political stage. But why, on the 30th anniversary of 
Taif, can Hizbullah still not be contained within the political and geographical boundaries of 
Lebanon? 
The argument presented is that the imperfect conditions set by the Taif accords both 
tamed aspects of Hizbullah within Lebanon whilst simultaneously presenting an opportunity 
for Hizbullah to influence events beyond their own boundaries. This paper will be broken into 
four sections. The first section will briefly describe the conditions in which Hizbullah emerged. 
Following from this, the effect of the Taif Accords will be explored with attention to the 
enduring confessional system, relations with external actors (notably Iran and Syria) before a 
final analysis of Hizbullah’s recent actions beyond Lebanese territory in Syria.  
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How Hizbullah emerged has been well catalogued.2 In brief, Hizbullah officially 
emerged with the Open Letter of 1985 published amidst an ongoing civil war and the second 
of Israel’s major invasions onto Lebanese soil. From discontent with the secular framework of 
AMAL, some members of the Shi’i community defected to form the leadership and cadres of 
Hizbullah. In Hamzeh’s words, Hizbullah emerged from conditions of ‘crisis’: “Theses crises 
have included the Arab defeats by Israel, the failure to achieve balanced socioeconomic 
development, the pervasiveness of political oppression, gross misdistribution of wealth, and 
the disorientating psychological impact of Westernization”.3 Few of these were sufficiently 
tackled in the Taif agreement leaving the Lebanese state in perpetual fragility.  
The civil war saw the collapse of the Lebanese state in all but name and had a 
devastating impact on individuals and communities leaving an estimated 144,240 dead, 197, 
506 injured, and over 17,000 disappeared between 1975 and 1990.4 Unwillingness, or inability, 
to directly combat the after effects of the civil war by the Lebanese state has resulted in what 
Barak has described as a state project of “amnesia” allowing space for what Deeb has coined 
as “the just-lived-past” to be remembered under alternative frameworks such as that posited by 
the religious national ideology of Hizbullah. The crisis conditions were exacerbated by the 
Lebanese political system itself, ongoing proxy wars against organised Palestinian groups in 
Lebanon and the demonstrative effect of the 1979 Iranian revolution.5 
Hizbullah found almost instant notoriety through its use of violence. Between 1982 and 
1983, Hizbullah successfully mounted attacks on French, Israeli and United States forces, 
driving Israel to withdraw to the South of Lebanon by 1985. Through numerous attacks and 
insurgencies Hizbullah succeeded in their nationalist aims to free Lebanon of direct Western 
intervention and claimed a self-declared a victory against Israel when the latter unilaterally 
withdraw from Lebanon in 2000. 
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The Taif Accords re-instated the Lebanese state and created a tense, but relatively stable 
peace which has been enjoyed for the past thirty years. The challenge for Hizbullah at the time 
was to find its place within the new political environment.  
The Post-Taif Environment 
Hizbullah emerged from the Taif Accords and the experience of the early 1990s as a different 
entity from what it had previously been. Hizbullah re-formulated itself from a clandestine 
movement to a democratic political party which retained arms in the name of “resistance”.  
For many, Hizbullah’s acceptance of the conditions offered by the Taif Accord led to 
what has been coined Hizbullah’s “Lebanonization” process. Saouli has stated that “in seeking 
domestic legitimacy, Hizbullah has conformed to Lebanese civil notions and discourse”.6 Yet, 
this perceived normalization has not prevented Hizbullah to act without the Lebanese state 
permission, or prior notification, as evidenced in Hizbullah’s abductions of Israeli personnel 
prior to the Israel-Hizbullah war of 2006, Hizbullah’s self- initiated violence within Lebanon 
in 2008 in the Beirut siege and Hizbullah’s ongoing activities in Syria and beyond. 
Various positions exist regarding the acceptance of the Lebanonization thesis. One 
position argues that Hizbullah’s seeming accommodation into the Lebanese political system is 
nothing more than a veneer disguising the real power and decision maker of the group – Iran. 
This sentiment was expressed succinctly by Zisser who stated that Hizbullah’s internal turn 
towards Lebanon is nothing more than ‘sham Lebanonization’: “The fact that in recent years 
its military power has grown to strategic proportions, with the aid and encouragement of Iran, 
proves that the Lebanese ‘veil’ worn by Hizbullah is exceedingly thin”.7 Currently the thesis 
that, Hizbullah are simply a tool of Iran, suits certain current state interests, for example Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf state suspicious of the increased Iranian presence and influence in the 
region. As such, Hizbullah become embroiled in regional rivalries and power plays. 
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The thesis of an emergent “Shia crescent”, controlled by Iran, has become a dominant 
narrative to explain the current balance of power rivalries in the region. However, the 
homogenous nature of the so-called “Shia crescent” has aroused criticisms and challenges. On 
the one hand, after the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the regional balance of power shifted 
towards Iran resulting in new power dynamics which threatened the security and legitimacy of 
the Gulf States. This saw the boundaries between Sunni and Shia raising in importance as states 
(both Arab and Persian) instrumentalized sectarian divisions for their own interests.8 On the 
other hand, the construct of a ‘Shia crescent’ disguises the internal rivalries within the alliance 
between Iran, Syria, Hizbullah and Iraqi Shia actors.9 Terhalle outlines four aspects that 
constrain the emergence of a homogenous monolithic Shia block led by Iran which includes: 
political, nationalist, religious and economic tensions. Pertinently, Terhalle reminds us of the 
divisions between Arab and Persian and the differing nationalist memories regarding the Iraq 
– Iran war, which acts as an obstacle to Iran’s influence within Shia Iraq. Perhaps the most 
salient argument against the narrative of the Shia Crescent is that outside of Iran (with the 
notable exception of Hizbullah), Khomeini’s concept of the rule of jurisprudent (wilayat al-
faqih) is rejected by most Syrian and especially Iraqi Shi’i.10 
Hizbullah’s assertive Shi’i identity and continued adherence to the Iranian wilayat al-
faqih cannot be understood solely in consideration of Iran but must be placed in context of both 
the circumstances of Hizbullah’s emergence and the conditions created by Taif. During the 
civil war when no functioning Lebanese state existed, and communities were drawn on 
sectarian identity, it made pragmatic sense to mobilise Shia identity around a recently 
successful revolution and one willing to act as material and ideological backers. Post Taif, 
ensured that Iran continued to play a role in the fragile peace. The retention of the confessional 
system and endurance of sectarianism assist in unlocking the capabilities to legitimately (in 
religious, if not state terms) draw from Iranian material support and religious authority. 
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However, Hizbullah have always denied that political affiliations with Iran override 
Lebanese interests. Nuanced work (offered by for example by De Vare and Stahli11 and 
Samil12) argue that far from being mere agents of Iran, Hizbullah are engaged in sustained 
efforts at creating a national identity and thus fully absorbed into the Lebanese state setting. 
Only the national identity created and reproduced by Hizbullah is an alternative vision of 
Lebanese identity. Saouli offers some insights into why conformity to Lebanese shared norms 
is not always apparent in the broad movement of Hizbullah. Important to its formation and 
continued existence is its broad appeal to Shi’ism. Drawing upon Shi’ism allows alternative 
identity constructions in addition to wider theological and historical ideas to be reinterpreted 
in contemporary times. 
 
Any social actor carries with it memories and experiences transmitted from the 
past which are built into its system and which shape its world outlook and 
behaviour as it faces contemporary struggles… While Shiism does not determine 
Hizbullah’s socio-political conduct, it does figure crucially in the organisation’s 
identity, consciousness and memory…13 
 
Constructions of identity and ideology, derived in part, from Shia history and memory have 
been allowed to cultivate in the era post-Taif. Ongoing sectarian assemblages permitted, and 
some14 would argue, deepened by Taif, has unlocked the transnational potential of Hizbullah’s 
identity narratives. Pre-empting discussion of Anderson’s focus on the role of census and 
identity categories, Anderson espoused that the census had immense capacity to shape the way 
in which the colonial state imagined itself and thus had enormous effect upon how the Lebanese 
understood their state and each other.15 Arguably, the continuation of religious groupings, 
further legitimized by the Taif Accords, has ensured that sectarian divisions endure. In this 
sense, what the Taif Accords achieved was a deepening of Lebanon’s understanding of itself 
as a fragmented nation. Instead of accentuating its “Lebaneseness”, the accords cemented 
further the sectarian divisions installed in the original 1932 French census, adding “national” 
legitimacy to the colonial legacy. 
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An important Shia collective memory is of the battle of Karbala and the Martyrdom of 
Imam Hussein. According to Saouli this has left two primary legacies. The first being for the 
fight for injustice and the second for self-protection.16 Both such legacies have been drawn 
upon regarding Hizbullah’s recent involvement in Syria, specifically in relation to Husayn’s 
sister and daughter to martyred Ali, Sayyida Zaynab.17 Shrines to Zaynab, particularly the 
shrine in Damascus, were sites of intensive fighting between Hizbullah and anti-Assad and 
Daesh affiliated groups. In the name of both justice and self-protection, Daesh forces were 
thwarted in amongst rhetoric of fighting against oppression for justice and in the name of 
protection of both the Lebanese state and Shia communities and sacred sites. Slogans such as 
“Zaynab thaniyaton” (“Zaynab won’t be captured twice”)18 has assisted in the mobilization of 
Shia individuals derived from multiple Arab and non-Arab states assisting in what has been 
referred to as ‘defensive jihad’.19 The importance of Zaynab to Shia mobilization generally and 
Hizbullah’s articulation of defensive ‘resistance’ can be demonstrated by the lyrics of a popular 
Hizbullah affiliated song “Fidaki Ya Zainab”: 
 
O’ takfiri, listen, 
Our nation will never surrender! 
O’Zaynab, we will sacrifice our souls for you, 
Troops of Hizbullah will obey you.20 
 
From the above, concepts such as national resistance are intermingled with Shia cultural 
memory. While sectarian differences are highlighted with reference to Shia history such as the 
battle of Karbala, the martyrdom of Husayn, and the struggle of Zaynab, Hizbullah do not set 
themselves against Sunni’s widely but ‘takfiri’s – a reference to Daesh’s use of ex-
communication (‘takfir’) and denunciation of the Shi’a as ‘heretics’. In this sense, Hizbullah 
can utilise wider Shia understandings which transcend nation-state geographies to legitimate 




From the above perspective, Hizbullah are not necessarily utilizing their Shi’i identity 
against their Sunni and Christian co-nationals at the behest of Iran. An alternative reading is 
offered by both Saade and Deeb, who argue that Hizbullah are simply engaging in their own 
formulation of what it means to be “Lebanese” within the frame provided by the divisions 
(re)established by the Taif Accords. Saade for instance argues that, “What Hizbullah has 
engaged with since its inception is a redefinition of what it is to be Lebanese, stranded by the 
experience of occupation, the marginalisation of the state, and alienation from a portion of the 
population”.21  
As discussed earlier, Hamzeh stated that Hizbullah were born of “crisis” which the Taif 
Accords did not attempt to solve. Ongoing political tensions and uneven socio-economic 
developments continue to marginalize Shia communities in Lebanon. Accordingly, Hizbullah’s 
project is to conceive of a Lebanese nationalism that positions the Shia community in a more 
central role, which, by doing so, is hoped to include rather than exclude Shia communities. 
Deeb, similarly, has argued that Hizbullah’s “alternative nationalism …views Lebanon 
as an Arab state that cannot distance itself from causes like that of Palestine”.22 Deeb views 
Lebanon as a site of contested representations of what it means to be “Lebanese” with 
Hizbullah’s position just being one narrative “among many competing ones”.23 Drawing on 
social and collective memory studies24, Deeb posits that Hizbullah are attempting to construct 
alternative imaginings of Lebanese nationalism and Lebanon’s place in the region and beyond. 
Hizbullah draw on their role against Israeli occupation focusing on their resistance as a sacrifice 
for the nation (not solely for the Shi’i) and their role in liberating Lebanon from Israeli 
occupation. According to Deeb, Hizbullah’s accentuation of its role against Israeli aggression 
not only positions it regionally with Palestine and other states positioned against Israel, but is 
intended to “incorporate the long-marginalized Shi’i community into the nation-state”.25 
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Through this lens, it is possible to infer that Hizbullah’s use of Shia political identity, is at least 
in part, about incorporating Shia narratives into the Lebanese national imagination. 
 
CONFESSIONALISM 
Lebanon’s confessional and sectarian divisions can be read as a legacy of both European and 
Islamic imperial understandings. A census taken in 1932 by the French administration framed 
Lebanon’s communities in religious groupings. While the Ottoman Empire had categorized its 
subjects in terms of Muslims and dhimmis (derived from the concept of ahl al-kitab (“People 
of the Book”); normally pertaining to Christians and Jews), the French bound religious 
identification with that of the nation-state. The framing of the census in religious groupings is 
diametrically opposed to Anderson’s assertion that “as the colonial period wore on the census 
categories became more visibly and exclusively, racial. Religious identity on the other hand, 
gradually disappeared”.26 Anderson espoused that the census had immense capacity to shape 
the way in which the colonial state imagined itself and ‘the legitimacy of its ancestry’ and thus 
had enormous effect upon how the Lebanese understood their state and each other.27 
Arguably, the continuation of religious groupings allowed the imperial and Islamic 
organization of Lebanon’s dhimmi populations to endure. A concrete example of this 
confessional structuring can be seen (amongst others such as memorandums of understanding 
with other religious parties) in the creation of the “Multi-confessional Lebanese Brigades” that 
have allowed resistance fighters that are non-Shia to fight alongside Hizbullah’s resistance 
forces without the need for conversion to any sect of Islam while simultaneously being under 
the “umbrella” leadership of Hizbullah.  
Hizbullah’s self-identification as specifically Shia, and the institutionalized sectarian 
divisions within Lebanon allowed for the construction of identities which imaginatively exceed 
nation-state borders. As Deeb argues, Hizbullah’s articulation of Lebanese national identities 
is just one in a “field of competing and negotiated histories and identities that has always 
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characterised Lebanon”.28 Seaver has argued that the creation of national identities becomes 
further complicated where groups are divided into identities which transcend state 
boundaries.29 The consequences of dividing Lebanon into groupings of religious affiliations 
has meant a continuation of solidarities with other “group” members across nation-state 
boundaries.  The imagined Shia community when connected to the political theological concept 
of the wilayat al-faqīh (jurist -theologian as constructed by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran) creates 
the hierarchical structuring that grants autonomous (sub)national actions which are subsumed 
under a larger hierarchical order emanating from the Supreme Guide of Iran. 
Regarding the hierarchical structuring, Nasrallah stated “Should the jurisprudent ruler be 
the one to appoint the leaders and bestow legitimacy upon them in all Muslim countries? Yes, 
because his jurisprudence is not limited by geographic boundaries, it extends to wherever 
Muslims may be”.30 Islam’s hierarchical imperial legacies have been re-interpreted in light of 
the realities of the nation-state international structure. The hierarchical structuring can be 
evidenced more recently in what the Secretary General of Hizbullah has termed the “Resistance 
Axis” in actions against Daesh (ISIS) and other Sunni militia movements in Iraq and Syria. 
Nasrallah stated that “The resistance Axis started to be formed… Its main support is the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Syria…”31 Yet Hizbullah are careful not to undermine their own national 
autonomy and make the separation between religious authority and political authority in Iran. 
In 2015 Nasrallah emphasised that  
I claim that we – Hizbullah – have had ties of friendship and adoration with Iran 
since 1982…. I believe that his Eminence Imam Sayyed Ali Khamenei is the Imam 
and leader of Muslims. Still… Iran never ordered us or informed us of an order… 
We are independent leadership… Iran is an Islamic Republic. It is the state of 
Islam. It is the state of Imam Khomeini… Iran helps Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Iraq 
and other places and still, it does not dictate…32 
The incorporation of several autonomous (national) realms evidenced by the inclusion of 
“Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and other places” with the “main support” from the “Islamic 
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Republic of Iran” consequently grants evidence for the hierarchical imperial structuring 
identified. Saad has stated that “Force integration among Hizbullah’s Resistance Army, the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Syrian armed forces and Iraqi militias has led to 
the emergence of a single military front”.33 This single “military front” is possible due to the 
hierarchical structuring that links Hizbullah to the legal supra-state of the Iranian Supreme 
Guide. Nasrallah himself announced that “The fusion of Lebanese – Iranian blood on Syrian 
soil reflects the unity of cause and the unity of fate of the countries of the resistance Axis… 
We no longer recognize the separation of arenas or battlefields”.34  Saliently, Nasrallah in this 
instance does not draw on Shia identity and religious ideology, but on national identity 
(Lebanese and Iranian) and mutual “cause” and “fate”. Here the “resistance Axis” is 
constructed around common goals and interests which align the two states regardless of 
sectarian affiliation. Again, a dualism can be observed where Shia hierarchical structures allow 
for Hizbullah’s alignment with Iran to be religiously legitimized whilst careful not to 
undermine their own nationalist credentials within Lebanon itself. 
Consociational Structures 
The 1989 Taif Accords stipulated that sectarianism in Lebanon be abolished; yet, not only has 
this not been achieved in many ways sectarian divisions have both spread and deepened. The 
1943 National Pact affirmed confessional political arrangements, but borrowed from the 
Ottoman’s division of peoples into separate millets (or communities) based on religious 
orientation and sect.  
In Lebanon’s diverse social mix, the Taif Accords were designed to ensure that no 
group had dominant sway over any others. However, Taif was incomplete, leaving particulars 
to be dealt with at a later date. Particulars have been ever evolving and often negotiated in tense 
periods of conflict and fragility and resulted in fragmented and complex power relations. One 
important such incident occurred in 2008 after Hizbullah initiated a six-day armed takeover of 
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parts of central Beirut. Following negotiations with the March 14 Alliances, Hizbullah were 
granted major concessions the most important being veto power in the cabinet.  
The Taif accords not only failed to dismantle confessional arrangements but 
strengthened them by sealing the constitutional arrangement that the president be a Maronite 
Christian and the prime minister a Sunni Muslim. A tentative concession was granted to the 
Shia by allocating them the position of speaker of the house. These sectarian arrangements are 
still based on the only national consensus taken in Lebanon by the French in 1932 and thus fail 
to reflect contemporary demographic realities.35 In short, Shia communities in Lebanon remain 
as politically marginalized post-Taif as prior to it.  Despite ongoing, and increasing, sectarian 
tensions, dialogue and understandings are possible between groups evidenced in the 2006 
Hizbullah alliance with Michael Aoun’s Christian Free Patriotic Movement Party.   
One of the unintended consequences of the continuation of confessional systems is that 
different groups are proposing different “nationalist imaginaries”. Saade has argued that 
through Hizbullah’s commemorative activities (Jerusalem day, etc,) Hizbullah are writing a 
“project of resistance” that goes “beyond the boundaries of state”.36 Saade maintains that what 
Hizbullah are engaged in is a form of “ideological activism” which is most likely to occur in 
environments of competition where one or more group is contending for dominance.37 While 
the Taif accords ideally were to rid Lebanon of competition between sects, what was left 
uncertain and undetermined have become areas of contestation and competition for resources, 
legitimacy and power. 
TAIF AND EXTERNAL ACTORS 
The Taif Accords were an incomplete experiment pregnant with internal contradictions. Whilst 
the Accords explicitly call for reforms that would promote and build national solidarities and 
consensus the Accords themselves gave little indication of how this could be achieved 
practically or in what time frame.38 
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Lebanon, in its relatively short period since independence, has consistently suffered 
from a sovereignty deficit. As Strindberg and Warn suggest “Lebanon has never been left to 
run itself but has repeatedly been sucked into the vortex of regional and global power 
politics”.39 Taif, augmented the sovereignty deficit by ensuring external powers involved in the 
brokering of the peace, remained as a visible presence in Lebanon (specifically Syria and to a 
lesser extent, Iran). Strindberg and Warn go on to argue that perhaps for Hizbullah, Islamism 
is not merely for power and control but a tool of resistance “against some other kind of order”.40 
In a way, Strindberg and Warn compliment Saade and Deeb’s concept of Hizbullah 
constructing “alternative nationalisms” in an environment of competing and contested concepts 
of what it means to be Lebanese. In resisting dominant norms and regimes of order, Hizbullah’s 
external relations can be viewed less through the lens of shared Shi’ism and more appropriately 
through the frame of Third World nationalism that seeks to challenge Western domination in 
pursuit of self-determination and dignity. This also deepens understandings of Hizbullah’s 
transnational actions as an attempt to surface above Western dominant norms and Israeli 
occupation. In this quest for dignity, Syria and Iran as backers of the resistance, act as pragmatic 
collaborators rather than directors of Hizbullah. 
Syria 
The October Taif Accords of 1989 effectively both ended the civil war and undermined 
Lebanese sovereignty by ensuring Syria was left as the dominant power in Lebanon.41 
Hizbullah’s relations with the Syrian government are largely pragmatic rather than ideological. 
Syria’s shared border with Lebanon and Iran ensures that flows of arms, finance and logistical 
support can easily be transported across borders. This pragmatic material arrangement suits 
both party’s interests in so much as they share the common enemy of Israel. However, this 
pragmatic alliance is not as ‘natural’ as often popularly portrayed.  
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Tensions between the two actors have at times escalated to violent conflict such as in 
May 1986 when kidnappings and shoot outs emerged between Syrian soldiers and Hizbullah 
members resulting in the detention of several Hizbullah members.42 Another such incident 
involved the killing of 26 Hizbullah militants at the hands of the Syrian army in 1987 in what 
became known as the “Fathalla Massacre”.43 
Relations are further complicated between Syria and Hizbullah if the relations between 
AMAL and Syria are also taken into the equation. In many ways, the Shia (yet secular) party 
of AMAL are closer to Syria than the movement of Hizbullah. The AMAL/Hizbullah war 
which broke out in 1988 was essentially ended due to the external pressures from Iran and 
Syria with Iran supporting Hizbullah and Syria leaning more heavily towards AMAL.44 The 
relationship between Hizbullah and Syria is also troubled by Syria’s perception of Greater Syria 
that includes territories in Lebanon (amongst others).45 Nonetheless, pragmatism comes to the 
fore as without Syrian backing it would have been extremely difficult for Iran to transfer 
material supplies to Hizbullah. 
Relations between Hizbullah and Syria took a new turn after the Syrian withdrawal 
from Lebanon in 2005 following both domestic and international pressure on Syria for its 
alleged involvement in the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005. 
Opponents to Hizbullah had hoped that the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon would leave 
Hizbullah exposed and isolated within the region. However, Hariri’s demise and Syria 
withdrawal split Lebanon internally with the emergence of the March 8 – derived from the 
Hizbullah led demonstrations in solidarity to Syria – and the March 14 Coalition – named after 
the larger demonstration compiled of a variety of anti-Syrian actors. 
Ayoob has argued that Hizbullah’s affiliation with Syria is less about religious 
solidarities and far more about the creation and sustainment of an alternative counter-
hegemonic movement that recognizes international power is heavily swayed against Muslim 
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majority states. Hizbullah alongside states such as Iran and Syria, continue an anti-colonial 
stance against the Israeli state but also against international norms perceived to be in the 
interests of Western (especially, U.S) interests. Syria has stood alone amongst its Arab 
neighbours in offering support to Hizbullah which was especially apparent after the 2006 
invasion of Lebanon. During and directly after the Israel-Hizbullah war of 2006, Arab states 
did little to condemn Israeli action causing the vast majority of Arab regimes being categorised 
as “half -men”: a term originally espoused by Bashir Assad to characterize those figures and 
regimes in the Arab world unsupportive of Hizbullah’s resistance against Israel.46 
Hizbullah and Syrian relations have thus been historically tense and thus should not be 
read as a ‘natural’ sectarian alignment. However, the conditions of the Accords, which granted 
Syria a firm place within Lebanon and impacted upon its territorial sovereignty, assisted greatly 
in firming Syrian-Hizbullah relations. Assistance and rhetorical support from Assad’s regime 
towards Hizbullah must be placed within the context of the post-Taif framework. Syria’s direct 
presence within Lebanon granted the pragmatic opportunity to allow material support to flow 
from Iran in addition to bolstering Assad’s anti-Israel position vis a vis other Arab states. From 
the internal perspective of Lebanon however, Syria’s physical presence was a visible reminder 
of Lebanon’s sovereignty deficit in addition to providing further fuel for sectarian and 
ideological divisions within Lebanese national frames. 
Iran 
As well as material support, Iran has provided important political influences specifically in line 
with the concept of the wilayat al-faqih.  The first set of elections held in Lebanon following 
the Taif accords resulted in internal debates regarding whether Hizbullah should participate in 
the flawed and highly compromised sectarian assemblage. The internal strife -a consequence 
of the new power sharing arrangement - resulted in Hizbullah turning to the wilayat al-faqih in 
Iran to pronounce the legitimacy of participating in the parliamentary process. 
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The dilemma of the new situation that arose from Taif was espoused by Qassem as: 
‘Participation in parliamentary elections is an expression of sharing in an existing 
political structure…It does not, however, represent a commitment to preserving the 
structure as it is, or require defence of the systems deficiencies and blemishes’.47 
As the above infers, Hizbullah’s acceptance of sectarian arrangements solidified in the 
Taif accords, should not be equated with a defence of confessional arrangements. Hizbullah’s 
decision to accept a modus vivendi with the conditions of Taif was, at least in part, a hope to 
reform the sectarian system from within the democratic framework. 
Hizbullah’s relations with Iran are not untroubled especially in regard to Shia leaders 
within Lebanon itself most pertinently exemplified by Ayatollah Fadlallah who, while deeply 
respected by Hizbullah and referred to in some literature as the “ideologue” of Hizbullah48, 
came to heads with the Supreme Guide of Iran in 1995 by challenging Ayatollah Khamenaei’s 
position as the wilayat al-faqih. 
To argue that Iran are merely a proxy of Iran lacking internal agency is an over-reliance 
on nation-state frameworks and a premature dismissal of non-state actors. While Iran provides 
ideological and religious justification for Hizbullah and certainly external material and political 
support, it cannot be justifiably asserted that Hizbullah have no autonomous agency. As 
DeVare and Stahli robustly argue 
‘Although Iran’s provision (with Syria) of weaponry, financial aid, and sanctuary 
enabled Hizbullah to equip large insurgent forces, the organisational successes 
were a product of tactics devised and implemented by its Lebanese cadres, who 
drew more heavily on their prior experience in Lebanon’s civil War than on the 
inexpert advice offered by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps. Consequently, 
Iranian support strengthened Hizbullah only in so far as the organisation creatively 




Writing in 2008, Samil forcefully adds that “Hizbullah is pursuing its own agenda in 
Lebanon, and this is increasingly at odds with the objectives of Tehran and Damascus”.50 The 
outbreak of the Syrian civil war and continued conflict in Iraq has simply laid the conditions 
for further pragmatic cooperation between Iran, Syria and Hizbullah. 
In certain respects, Hizbullah’s relations with the state of Iran cannot be separated from 
their view of the Lebanese state itself. Prior to the signing of Taif, there was clear indication 
that Hizbullah’s views on the Lebanese state were predominantly negative (not surprising given 
at the time the state itself was in collapse). Hizbullah early publications via al-‘Ahd, lays blame 
on the Lebanese state evident in article titles such as “The Litani project, A Signal of State 
Neglect of the Region of the South”.51 “It is because the state was deemed illegitimate and 
bankrupt that one needed alternative sources of authority”52 hence, Hizbullah’s relationship 
with Iran which coincides with its Shia orientation and resistance against Israel. 
It can therefore be argued that Hizbullah’s continued relations with both Syria and Iran 
are highly pragmatic and provide material support. While a strong religious connection exists 
between Hizbullah and Iran, in the former’s adherence to the concept of the wilayat al-faqih, 
no such religious connections are inherent with the Syrian regime of Assad. Essentially the 
relations with Syria and Iran are pragmatic and have been enabled by Taif accords themselves 
and the conditions set by them. Hizbullah have utilized, especially Syrian support, for material 
benefits and a claim to international legitimacy. “Diplomatic recognition and support in 
International forums provide non-state groups with an aura of legitimacy and complicates their 
opponent’s efforts to repress them”.53 Taif therefore set the conditions for both Syrian and 
Iranian relations with Hizbullah to cement and for all sides to gain elements of legitimacy. In 
the case of Syria, Hizbullah gained recognition and material support as an important regional 
actor while Syria itself was able to bolster its anti-Israeli stance. Iran on the other hand, grants 
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Hizbullah religious legitimacy and can appeal to wider collective Shia memories and histories 
while Iran utilises its strong relations with Hizbullah as a deterrence against Israel and to retain 
a foothold in the Arab world. 
RETENTION OF ARMS 
The Taif Accord famously demanded the disarming of all militia groups. In an act of creativity 
and ingenuity, Hizbullah refused to be coined as a “militia” and re-emphasised their declaration 
as a “resistance” force. In accepting Hizbullah’s self-titled “resistance” the Taif government 
essentially endorsed Hizbullah’s continued bearing of arms, actions against the Israeli state and 
recognising the group as an integral part of the “national resistance”.54 
The Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000 was marked as a triumphant victory 
by Hizbullah yet left the movement in a precarious position as the end of occupation left the 
party bereft of justification for its continued arms55 and under increased, international pressure 
to disarm. In 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1559 demanding 
the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon in addition to the withdrawal of Syrian troops. In 
response, Nasrallah stated that Hizbullah would disarm if, and only if, this was put to a popular 
referendum56 shaking the confessional system by demanding a “one man one vote” whilst 
counting that the Shia demographic majority would challenge the Lebanese state’s desire to 
risk losing the referendum. 
Astutely manoeuvring the system, Hezbollah had accepted confessionalism, and 
thereby the continued discrimination of the Shi’a community, on condition that its 
right to keep the resistance under arms would not be infringed. A popular 
referendum outside the discriminatory confines of sectarian quotas would 
illuminate the numerical strength of the Shi’a and hence the deceptiveness of the 
strength of other communities.57  
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The point being that thirty years (and more) of consociationalism has resulted in 
Hizbullah finding accommodation to a system it swore to reform if not annihilate. The 
conditions set by Taif have become entrenched over the years since its signing resulting in a 
provisional normalization of the consociational structure. This normalization is evidenced 
when Hizbullah have been forced to choose between its stance on reforming sectarian 
arrangements and its continued bearing of arms. As Strindberg and Warn suggest, “Hizbullah 
agreed to abide by a system it considered unfair and discriminatory and in exchange it would 
maintain its logic of resistance”.58 ‘Resistance’ here can be understood not only in Hizbullah’s 
armed opposition to Israel but also in its resistance to contested imaginations of Lebanese 
nationalism against its own. Nonetheless, this “resistance” is both framed and contained within 
the post-Taif order. In one sense, Hizbullah resist the sectarian structures of Taif and yet, as 
indicated above can also assist in sustaining and maintaining that very same system by utilising 
its Shi’i identity above that of Lebanese   
One year following the Syrian withdrawal of Lebanon, Lebanon was thrust once again 
into violence in the 34-day long Hizbullah-Israel war of 2006. For Hizbullah and supporters, 
Israeli military intervention vindicated both the need to retain arms and the necessity of 
remaining politically linked to Syria. It is generally accepted that Israeli initial aims were the 
complete annihilation of Hizbullah which failed. Further international attempts to disarm 
Hizbullah were adopted in UNSC resolution 1701, yet Nasrallah responded with the “Divine 
Victory” speech in September asserting Hizbullah’s resolve and experience was stronger than 
ever.  
Hizbullah’s argument that as a resistance force, the retention of arms is necessary to act 
as a deterrent to future Israeli interventions in Lebanon, has to some extent crossed the sectarian 
divide. Michael Aoun, the Christian President articulated in 2017 that “Hezbullah has a right 
to keep its weapons to protect Lebanon from Israel”.59 With mounting conflict along the 
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Lebanon/Syrian border, violence once again becomes the norm and Hizbullah’s retention of 
arms makes sense within this context. As Rifaat Nasrallah, a Christian militia leader, has 
articulated, Hizbullah are not merely a proxy of Iran and an agent of Syria they are Lebanese 
and fully integrated into Lebanese daily life. “The resistance is not some external force that 
comes to terrorise us. They are part of our society. They attend our weddings and funerals. 
They take care of me and I take care of them”.60 
Hizbullah as a resistance force, while shrouded in Shia symbolism and ideology is also 
narrated as defence of Lebanon for all Lebanese. Hizbullah position the Shia as defenders of 
the nation thus attempting to secure a central place for the Shia in Lebanese national frames. 
The Israel – Hizbullah war of July 2006 vindicated Hizbullah’s insistence in retaining their 
arms. Nasrallah declared Hizbullah’s continued resistance, and armed struggle, against Israel 
was more than just the protection of Lebanon, but a battle fought on behalf of the entire umma.61 
Though such statements may rarely correspond to any practical support to other Islamist 
movement, such rhetoric can be a powerful speech act in creating senses of cross-border 
solidarities.  
Hizbullah’s continued resistance to Israel has profound implications for the Lebanese 
state’s monopoly of violence. Hizbullah do not threaten the nation-state’s existence but 
challenge some of its theoretical assumptions. Hizbullah’s violence is not aimed at the 
Lebanese nation-state as a strategy to gain political power but is given permission by the nation-
state to continue its Islamic resistance: a resistance born from the contemporary reality of 
Israeli incursions, ideologically justified by appeal and interpretation from Islamic history, and 
legitimated in state terms in the post-Taif agreements. 
Post the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, Hizbullah have sought to legitimate 
themselves as more than a militia ingraining the movement in Lebanese consciousness by 
embarking upon a wide range of social and economic ventures. Arguably this is not a 
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transformation of the party’s agenda but a changed emphasis in altered socio-political 
conditions. The transformation was not instantaneous with the signing of the Taif Accords. 
Between 1983 and 1987 (well before the signing of Taif), Hizbullah established two hospitals, 
seventeen infirmaries, two dental clinics, and three pharmacies.62 Hizbullah are now associated 
with the “largest and most efficient social welfare networks” in Lebanon.63 
In the early period of Hizbullah’s creation the arbitrary borders of the nation-state were 
spurned. Shaykh Subhial al-Tufayli stated,  
We do not work or think within the borders of Lebanon...this little geometric box, 
which is one of the legacies of imperialism. Rather we seek to defend Muslims 
throughout the world.64 
Given the absence of a functioning centralized state, the lack of cohesion between Lebanon’s 
divided communities and the influence of several external countries (including Iran, Palestine 
and Syria) it is hardly surprising that in the mid-1980s Hizbullah did not think within the 
borders of Lebanon.  
In the aftermath of the Taif Accords, Hizbullah focused their violence almost solely 
upon Israel. Hizbullah were granted state permission to wage targeted attacks upon Israel in 
the South. The Taif Accords ultimately granted state legitimacy to Hizbullah’s violence which 
already benefited from clerical legitimacy.  
The tacit acceptance of the Taif Accords granted Hizbullah a legitimate voice upon 
Lebanon’s political scene. The shifting conditions post-Taif may have altered Hizbullah’s 
strategies, but also altered aspects of the Lebanese state. The Lebanese state while 
accommodating Hizbullah within its structure had to relieve itself of its monopoly of legitimate 
violence; this is not represented by the Lebanonization of Hizbullah, but as a de-nationalizing 
of legitimate violence. Indeed, the de-nationalization of Lebanese state violence goes beyond 
Hizbullah’s rhetoric against Israel. Following the kidnapping of Lebanese pilgrims by a Syrian 
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anti-government movement Nasrallah declared to the group “If you want war we can solve it 
with war, if you want peace then we can solve it with peace.”65 While only rhetoric, Hizbullah 
were able to declare the possibility of war on a non-state actor without either Lebanon or the 
international community batting an eyelid. The success of Hizbullah’s armed strategy resulted 
in Wiegand commenting that “Hizbullah is stronger, more effective, and has more resolve than 
the Lebanese army, and the government know this.”66 The post-Taif arrangement of allowing 
Hizbullah to retain arms in the name of ‘resistance’ therefore has created the conditions which 
has eroded the Lebanese state’s monopoly of violence both within, and without, Lebanese 
territory. 
“Better to fight them there than here” 
From 2014 onwards Hizbullah have been openly fighting beyond the borders of Lebanon 
alongside Syrian and Iraqi counter-parts. Not only have Hizbullah been instrumental in 
allowing the Syrian regime to regain control of rebel held areas, the cross-border experience is 
being argued to have improved Hizbullah’s effectiveness and strategies. Embroiling 
themselves physically in regional crisis has also ensured that Hizbullah remains an important 
regional player in its training capacities to other actors whether they be Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi 
or otherwise. Hizbullah are considered to have been instrumental in the effectiveness of pro-
Syrian regime forces.67 As one Hizbullah fighter in Syria remarked on his Syrian counter parts 
“they had no skill, no discipline and no leadership. Now, the men they have learned a lot and 
are very serious fighters. They’ve become more like Hizbullah”.68  Evidence has also suggested 
that Hizbullah have provided training in Iraq, utilising Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) since 
2014.69 
It is still fairly unclear which militias Hizbullah have been involved with specifically, 
but evidence suggests that Hizbullah have offered training and joint exercises with a number 
of forces allied to the Syrian regime and a number of Shia militias (Syrian, Iraqi and more). An 
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initial prominent Shia militia active in Damascus was the Abu Fadl al-Abas Brigade created in 
2012. According to a report conducted by Sullivan, Hizbullah have also drawn from Iraqi Shia 
militia such as Kataib Hizbullah and Asaib ahl al-haq.70 
Intervention in Syria granted the opportunity to present Hizbullah’s activities as 
1) Protecting all Lebanese from violent external opposition; 
2) Protecting important Shia shrines and communities from aggressive Sunni (“takfiri”) 
militias. 
While both presentations of the conflict converge into a rationale for why Hizbullah should 
retain arms, the logic plays to both national and sectarian objectives. The interplay between the 
national, Arab, Islamic and external dynamics are further evidenced in the statement by Sheikh 
Nabil Quak, a senior Hizbullah official, who claimed in 2014 that, “Day after day, it is 
becoming clearer to Lebanon, Arab and Muslim, and international communities that there is a 
need for Hizbullah to remain in Syria”.71 
The intertwining between the Lebanese/national and the region/Islamic has also frequently 
been raised in rhetoric by Sayyed Nasrallah who asked in 2016 “if the resistance in Lebanon 
was defeated, what would have happened to Lebanon and the region?”72 Once again, Hizbullah 
position themselves as defenders of the nation and the region and in so doing, create a narrative 
in which the Shia communities of Lebanon are central actors rather than marginalized 
peripheral communities. In one sense sectarian divisions are accentuated but also positively 
reaffirmed. For instance, Nasrallah spoke in 2013 arguing that “If we did not go to Syria, 
Lebanon would have turned into a second Iraq”.73 
Two rationales are being provided to legitimize Hizbullah’s actions in Syria and Iraq. 
Domestically, to Lebanese and Arab identities, Hizbullah emphasise their resistance role on 
behalf of the entire of Lebanon. Simultaneously, to the pious Shia communities in Lebanon, 
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Syria and Iraq, Hizbullah emphasise their religious tenants and express themselves as defenders 
of Shia people and sites particularly those associated with Zaynab, daughter of Ali and sister 
to the martyr Husayn. On the one hand, sectarian divisions are passed over in favour of national 
and pan-Arab sentiment whilst simultaneously action is being legitimated in specifically Shia 
terms to different audiences. While Hizbullah may be careful to not over stoke tensions within 
Lebanon itself, the increased sectarian rationale of its actions abroad may have unintended 
consequences. 
CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF TAIF 
The Taif Accords succeeded in re-establishing the Lebanese state and ensuring a period of 
relative, if fragile, peace. This success has ensured that Hizbullah have had to work and 
transform within the post-Taif arrangements. In many ways, the signing of Taif reformulated 
Hizbullah into a structured and overtly political party willing to work within a democratic 
system. The accommodation to the post-Taif environment is however a compromise on the part 
of Hizbullah and has allowed the movement to play on both its Lebanese and Shia credentials 
depending upon the audience and context. 
Drawing attention back to the beginnings of the paper, Hamzeh argued that Hizbullah 
were born of “crisis” conditions. These crisis conditions included poor socio-economic 
development, political stagnation, uneven distributions of resources and conspicuous 
Westernisation. None of these crises were sufficiently tackled by the Accords which left the 
details of how to overcome them to later debates. Coupled with the deepening of confessional 
arrangements the aftermath of Taif has resulted in identity categories and sectarian divisions 
being ripe for instrumentalization by a variety of actors both domestically and regionally to 
mobilise communities against grievances (real and imagined). 
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Internally, the conditions post-Taif has coerced Hizbullah to act within a national 
framework and adhere to electoral politics. The democratic structures and heterogeneous 
makeup of Lebanese populations has ensured that within Lebanon sectarian identity is often 
down played by Hizbullah. When Shia identity is utilized by Hizbullah in domestic politics, it 
is often done so to place Shi’ism in the centre of national imaginaries and thus reveals 
Hizbullah’s attempts to re-write what is conceived as ‘Lebanese’ and replace Shia communities 
from their marginalized position in Lebanese society. 
The peace Accords however not only changed the dynamics inside Lebanon but 
reformulated the environment of the region by ensuring that the actors who brokered the peace 
remained influential powers, especially Syria. As the paper argues, the Syrian/Hizbullah 
alliance cannot be understood as simply a natural sectarian alliance. Religious and doctrinal 
differences are stark between Hizbullah and the Assad regime and historically Syria favoured 
the secular AMAL party to Hizbullah. However, the continued presence of Syria in the years 
following Taif ensured that a pragmatic alliance strengthened between the two players 
converging in the shared anti-colonial stance towards Israel. 
The consociational arrangement of the Taif Accords has left in place the identity 
categories first introduced by the Ottoman millet system and re-introduced during French 
colonialism. Dividing national identity into sectarian divisions has ensured that cross-border 
affiliations continue as these identity categories are not contained, nor constrained, by national 
boundaries. The historical sectarian divisions, which were granted state legitimacy by the Taif 
accords, has ensured that solidarities can be activated and mobilized with other “sect” members 
which transcend state divides. Exemplified in the relationship between Iran and Hizbullah, 
continued reinforcement of sectarian identities has allowed both actors to religiously legitimate 
their cross-border activities particularly using Ayatollah Khomeini’s conceptualization of the 
wilayat al-faqih. The concept of the wilayat al-faqih is rejected by large swathes of Iraqi and 
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Syrian Shia inferring that a homogenous “Shia Crescent” is highly unlikely to emerge in the 
foreseeable future. Nonetheless, Shia identity can be mobilized (as Hizbullah have done) to 
legitimate transborder activities in the name of protection of Shia peoples and shrines. 
In a region engulfed with war, civil strife, rising sectarian divisions and external actors 
pitted against one another the outlook for the region, Lebanon specifically, and Hizbullah are 
ambiguous and fragile. Hizbullah’s involvement in Syria and Iraq have not been without there 
costs physically, materially and symbolically. Out of roughly 15,000 fighters it is believed that 
approximately 2,000 have died on Syria’s battlegrounds.74 
A growing fear is in regard to what Hizbullah will do once it withdraws from Syria as 
the movement itself has both transformed and hardened. As Menachem articulates, Hizbullah 
are “flush with arms from Iran, it now more closely resembles a regular and quite effective – 
army”.75 This has intensified Israeli fears with possibilities of renewed Israeli action against 
Hizbullah. As the Syrian efforts to control and eliminate opposition winds down, Israel fears 
the establishment of a “Shia ‘corridor” linking Iran to Lebanon via Syrian territory.76 This fear, 
as discussed earlier, is also shared by the Arab Gulf states who have flagged the dangers of an 
emerging “Shia crescent”. 
Hizbullah’s armed activities beyond Lebanon’s borders, may have added to the group’s 
experiences and demonstrated that once again the movement is highly adaptable in operational 
terms and capable of fighting several different types of conflicts in diverse terrains, it has also 
seriously increased the number and character of its enemies. Deemed as terrorist entities by the 
United States and Europe, through the current Saudi/Qatar divisions, increased pressure is 
being placed on Hizbullah and its supporters through regional and international bodies. Perhaps 
however the most dangerous consequences of Hizbullah’s intervention in Syria and beyond is 
the creation of enemies amongst a variety of Sunni movements and militias. While in one sense 
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this can be mitigated by the evidence that Shia groups in Syria have adopted the term 
“Hizbullah fi Suriya” (Hizbullah in Syria)77 bolstering the rank and file and providing targets 
external to Lebanon, on the other hand, militias divided by sectarian divisions is likely to add 
to sectarian tensions across the region. 
The 1989 Taif Accords succeeded in ending the civil war but has yet to prove its 
durability in sustaining peace. Taif was meant to rid Lebanon of the competition between sects 
but with sectarian divisions entrenched and so many issues left undetermined, Taif has ensured 
that uncertainties and competition over resources and power remain intact. Competition in 
Lebanon for material and political gain is often tied to sectarian identity thus granting the 
opportunity for Hizbullah to conceive of alternative (or competing) narratives of Lebanese 
nationalism that places Shia actors (and of course Hizbullah itself) as protectors and martyrs 
for the Lebanese nation. 
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